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MURRAY'S MODEST PROPOSAL-
ABOLISHING WELFARE AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Twenty years ago, a book on poverty swept through Washing-
ton. It was Michael Harrington's The Other America, the intellec-
tual parent-or godparent, at least-of the War on Poverty. Its 
message was that the government was morally obligated to do 
something about the forgotten American poor. 
During the past year, another book has been sweeping some 
Washington opinionmakers off their feet. Once again, the subject is 
poverty. But this time the message is far different. According to 
Charles Murray's Losing Ground, the War on Poverty was a tragic 
mistake. Murray believes the social programs of the last twenty 
years have hurt those they were designed to help. This is his own 
summary of the book: 
Basic indicators of well-being took a tum for the worse in the 1960s, most 
consistently and most drastically for the poor. In some cases, earlier progress 
slowed; in other cases mild deterioration accelerated; in a few instances advance 
turned into retreat. The trendlines on many of the indicators are-literally-unbe-
lievable to people who do not make a profession of following them. 
A government's social policy helps set the rules of the game-the stakes, the 
risks, the payoffs, the tradeoffs, and the strategies for making a living, raising a 
family, having fun, defining what "winning" and "success" mean. The more vul-
nerable a population and the fewer its independent resources, the more decisive is 
the effect of the rules imposed from above. The most compelling explanation for 
the market shift in the fortunes of the poor is that they continued to respond, as 
they always had, to the world as they found it, but that we-meaning the not-poor 
and un-disadvantaged-had changed the rules of their world. Not of our world, 
just of theirs. The first effect of the new rules was to make it profitable for the poor 
to behave in the short term in ways that were destructive in the long term. Their 
second effect was to mask these long-term losses-to subsidize irretrievable mis-
takes. We tried to provide more for the poor and produced more poor instead. We 
tried to remove the barriers to escape from poverty, and inadvertently built a trap. I 
Murray's solution? Abolish welfare, affinnative action, and virtu-
ally all other programs for the poor.2 
Because his proposal is so radical, some readers may be 
I. C. MURRAY, LosiNG GROUND: AMERICAN SociAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 8-9 
(1984). 
2. /d. at 221-23, 227-28. 
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tempted to dismiss Murray as a conservative crackpot-the James 
Watt of poverty law. That would be a mistake. Although a strong 
strain of conservative ideology emerges now and then,J the bulk of 
his book is thoughtful and well-documented. Unlike some conserv-
atives, he is generous in praising the good intentions of those who 
led the War on Poverty. His statistics check out against other 
sources. And, for whatever it is worth, he is being taken very seri-
ously indeed by Washington policymakers. 
Besides its general social significance, Murray's thesis has a 
good deal of relevance to constitutional law. Among the culprits 
for the present plight of the poor, he includes Supreme Court deci-
sions imposing constitutional restrictions on welfare agencies, 
schools, and the police. 4 He also calls for an end to affirmative ac-
tion.s If he is correct, a variety of Supreme Court decisions from 
Goldberg v. Kelly to Fullilove v. Klutznick and perhaps even Mapp 
and Miranda should be reconsidered. 
Although this essay will focus on Murray's book, I will also 
have occasion to discuss two other recent books on race and poverty 
in America. One is by Michael Harrington. Although he realizes 
that the political timing is hardly right for a new war on poverty, 
Harrington's The New American Poverty is intended to lay the intel-
lectual foundation for a future crusade against poverty. Unlike 
Murray, Harrington draws on years of experience with the poor, as 
well as using the statistical approach favored by Murray. He is per-
haps at his best in attacking conservative views. The other book, 
Blacks and Whites: Narrowing the Gap? by Reynolds Farley, is a 
sober, objective attempt to assess the current economic status of 
American blacks. Farley's book is an invaluable analysis of census 
statistics over the last thirty-five years. In important respects, Far-
ley and Harrington both disagree with Murray. To a startling de-
gree, however, Farley (a mainstream academic) and Harrington (a 
democratic socialist) confirm the statistical evidence underlying 
Murray's neoconservative thesis. 
I 
The facts are not very much in dispute. From 1950 to 1964 
(about when poverty was "discovered" by Washington policymak-
ers), the percentage of the population below the poverty line 
3. This seems especially clear in his discussion of the weakening linkage between social 
outcomes and individual merit, which suggests that he would have moral objections to wel-
fare even if it had none of the adverse practical effects he identifies. See id. at 178-91. 
4. Jd. at 164, 173. 
5. Jd. at 223. 
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dropped from about 30% to 18%. During the remainder of the 
Johnson years, poverty continued dropping at about the same rate.6 
As Figure 1 shows, however, progress in eliminating poverty 
stopped just about when large amounts of federal money began 
pouring into the welfare system.7 Rather aptly, Murray calls this 
the "poverty/spending paradox." Indeed, the amount of latent 
poverty-the number who are over the poverty line only because of 
some form of welfare--has gotten a bit worse--up from 18.2% in 
1968 to 22% in 1980.s 
It is bad enough that poverty remained constant despite the 
increased spending. But at about the same time, several other in-
6. /d. at 58. 
7. Figure 1 is taken from id. at 57. 
8. /d. at 64-65. 
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dicators got much worse. 9 One set of indicators relates to the black 
family. From 1950 to 1963, the percentage of illegitimate black 
births rose slightly (from 17% to 23%). By 1980, however, 48% of 
black births were to single women. The percentage of white illegiti-
mate births increased at an even more dramatic rate, but from a 
much smaller baseline-from under 2% to 11% over the same pe-
riod. IO This suggests that the increase of black illegitimate births 
may have been at least partly due to causes unrelated to race. 
A related trend concerns the number of female-headed house-
holds. In 1965, Daniel Moynihan achieved instant notoriety with a 
report on the breakup of black families. As Murray noted, "[a]t the 
time Moynihan wrote his report, the rate of decline in two-parent 
families that had caused the uproar was about to triple."11 Until 
about 1967, the proportion of black female-headed households was 
stable at about 25%-28%. By 1980, it had leaped to 41%.12 More 
alarmingly, by 1980, 44% oflow-income blacks lived in such house-
holds, as did 65% of all blacks below the poverty line.I3 
Think of it this way: by 1980, two out of every three poor 
blacks lived in a household with no father or husband present. Cen-
sus analysts report that by 1980 changes in family composition ac-
counted for one-third of the American poor.I4 This phenomenon 
has become known as the "feminization of poverty." 
These statistics may misleadingly suggest a picture of an in-
creasing number of black women, who have never been married, 
each having an increasing number of illegitimate children. The 
phrase "the feminization of poverty" also tends to suggest that fe-
male-headed households are poorer than they used to be. At the 
risk of a slight digression, these widespread beliefs deserve a closer 
look. 
Farley's careful analysis demonstrates that these impressions 
are false. True, the number of single black women has risen, but an 
equally important trend is the similar increase in the percentage of 
divorced black women. Is (The divorce rate for blacks is about twice 
that for whites, while a divorced black woman is only half as likely 
to remarry as a white woman.)I6 By 1980, only a third of black 
9. One that Murray discusses is crime, but because criminology is such a complex field 
in its own right, his theories about crime will not be discussed here. 
10. See C. MURRAY, supra note l, at 125-29. 
11. /d. at 129. 
12. /d. at 129-30. 
13. /d. at 132. 
14. /d. at 133. 
15. R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE GAP? 136 (1984). 
16. /d. 
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women were married and living with their husbands.17 
The figures on black illegitimate births may also be somewhat 
misleading, conjuring up a picture of increasingly fertile single wo-
men. It is true that the percentage of illegitimate black births has 
risen to almost 60%. But the fertility rate (number of births per 
100,000 women) of unmarried black women actually declined dur-
ing the 1970's. Is This paradox is explained by two additional facts: 
the total number of single black women increased dramatically, and 
the birth rate for married women went down even more sharply 
than that for single women. I9 As a result, despite the declining 
birth rate of single black women, they accounted for a much higher 
percentage of births. 
As a consequence of these various trends, by 1980 only 40% of 
black children lived with both parents. About one in five lived with 
a mother who had never married. Furthermore, almost one out of 
every eight black children lives with neither parent.2o (Where are 
these children living? With grandparents? In foster homes? In in-
stitutions? No one seems to have an explanation for this appalling 
statistic.) Most black children of divorced parents never return to a 
two-parent family.21 
As Farley points out, the facts behind the "feminization of 
poverty" are also complex. Actually, at least until 1978, the pov-
erty rate for female-headed black households was declining.22 
Moreover, these households also had slightly increasing per capita 
incomes. The problem is that everybody else's per capita income 
rose much more sharply.2J As a result, female-headed households 
fell behind economically. A much higher proportion of male-
headed families escaped from poverty fom 1960-1980 (and they 
were never more than one-half the poor).24 Just as the birth rate 
among single black women has declined, so has their poverty rate. 
In both instances, however, the decline was outweighed by the dis-
17. /d. at 137. 
18. /d. at 139. 
19. See id.; C. MURRAY, supra note I, at 125-26. 
20. SeeR. FARLEY, supra note 15, at 141. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. at 160. 
23. /d. at 158-61. As Farley explains: 
In an absolute sense, families headed by women are not getting any poorer over 
time. They made modest gains in per capita income in the 1960s and 1970s. How-
ever, their gains were small compared to those of families that included a married 
couple. Thus, relative to husband-wife families, female-headed familes are getting 
poorer. Economic polarization by type of family is occurring among both blacks 
and whites. 
/d. at 187 (emphasis in original). 
24. /d. at 160. 
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proportionate growth in the absolute numbers of single black wo-
men and the sharper decline in the relevant rates for other groups. 
So far, we have mostly been discussing the situation of black 
women. We will leave to the next section the earnings of employed 
black men. But in discussing poverty, we cannot ignore the prob-
lem of joblessness. Let's begin with what economists call unem-
ployment-people who are looking for work but can't find it. 
Obviously, unemployment fluctuates with the state of the economy; 
indeed, economic growth has even stronger effects on black unem-
ployment than white unemployment.2s The unemployment rate for 
blacks is consistently about twice that for whites, but the difference 
is increasing. In Farley's carefully neutral academic prose, "There 
is a long-term trend toward a larger racial difference in the propor-
tion of men who cannot find work."26 As Murray points out, much 
of the increased black unemployment is concentrated among young 
blacks.21 
Even more serious are the figures on what economists call la-
bor force participation, the number working or looking for work. 
Beginning sometime in the 1960's, labor force participation by black 
men began to decline sharply.2s Farley observes that most of the 
decline came after 1970. By 1982, 12% of black men were out of 
the labor force and not even looking for work.29 (An equal number 
were unable to find work.) Several explanations have been 
proposed: 
(1) They're discouraged because they're unable to find work.30 
(2) They're disabled) I 
(3) They're living on other sources of income like crime or welfare (their own or 
someone else's).32 
There seems to be relatively little evidence available to test these 
hypotheses. Clearly, this is an area in urgent need of serious 
attention. 
By now, the reader may be a bit sick of all these statistics-but 
25. /d. at 39-40. 
26. /d. at 40. 
27. See C. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 71-75. 
28. SeeR. FARLEY, supra note 15, at 40; C. MuRRAY, supra note 1, at 75-78. Harring-
ton agrees. See Harrington, Crunched Numbers: Charles Mu"ay's Stunted Statistics, NEw 
REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 1985, at 7,8 (noting, however, that the drop between 1958 and 1969 was 
as great as the drop between 1969 and 1981). 
29. R. FARLEY, supra note 15, at 42. 
30. This is Farley's explanation. /d. 
31. See Harrington, supra note 28, at 8-9; M. HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN 
POVERTY 146 (1984). 
32. This is essentially Murray's hypothesis. See C. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 81, 159-
60. 
1985] WELFARE PROPOSAL 293 
the numbers deserve a more thoughtful response than nausea. Pov-
erty, far from disappearing, has proved itself quite resistant to at-
tack. In some respects, the problem is getting worse. Poverty is not 
a politically attractive issue these days. Even in the relatively liberal 
law school world, who teaches or writes about "Law and Poverty" 
anymore? Even the critical legal scholars don't seem to have much 
to say about the poor. It's about time poverty received some serious 
attention. 
II 
One way of summarizing this data is to say that despite in-
creased federal efforts, poverty has gotten worse. Murray, however, 
would put it differently. He would say that poverty has gotten 
worse precisely because of the federal effort. His solution is to end 
the federal programs, including not only funding for AFDC, but 
presumably also various Supreme Court rulings ostensibly calcu-
lated to assist the poor.33 
Murray's proposal is entirely dependent on his causation hy-
pothesis. How good is his evidence that federal aid to the poor has 
caused increased poverty and dependency, the breakdown of the 
black family, and so on? He makes three basic arguments for his 
causal link. 
The first argument is that so many indicators got bad just when 
the federal government started spending a lot of money. Murray 
effectively illustrates this argument with a number of rather dra-
matic graphs. The problem, of course, is that the world changed in 
many ways between 1965 and 1975. How can we know that one 
particular change in government policy caused the problem? Mur-
ray attempts to rebut some other possible explanations but only in a 
rather half-hearted way.34 
He also presents some other dramatic graphs showing that the 
situation in 1980 is much worse than a statistician would have pre-
dicted from earlier trends.Js Again, at best this only shows that 
something unexpected happened. In addition, we are given no rea-
son to believe that such stastistical predictions are generally accu-
rate. For example, would his 1950's trends have predicted his 
1960's data? If not, it is no surprise that the predictions for 1980 
33. Somewhat inconsistently, Murray is willing to tolerate local welfare and private 
charity. Also, after some hesitation, he has now decided to tolerate unemployment compen-
sation, and presumably Social Security for the retired. So his solution is not quite as brutal as 
it first appears, but it is nonetheless quite radical. See id. at 227-33. 
34. See id. at 58-63. For a general discussion of the causation issue, see Jencks, Book 
Review, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BooKS, May 9, 1985, at 41. 
35. See C. MURRAY, supra note I, at 140. 
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were off. Finally, one suspects that the results of such predictions 
are rather sensitive to methodological choices. Perhaps other meth-
ods would have led to more accurate predictions; Murray had little 
reason to try to improve the accuracy of the predictions. The 
graphs are rhetorically quite effective, but the best that can really be 
said for them is that they are mildly suggestive of a connection be-
tween government spending and various poverty indices. 
Murray's second argument is that if you reduce the penalty for 
being poor, you reduce the incentive to get out of poverty. In par-
ticular, Murray argues that changes in welfare rules made marriage 
and full-time employment less attractive, and welfare more attrac-
tive.36 This is undoubtedly true, and any economist would expect 
this change in incentives to change behavior. This argument plausi-
bly indicates that some part of the problems Murray identifies is due 
to the decreased penalties for poverty. But no sophisticated econo-
mist would say that this argument proves that the changed incen-
tive structure caused the entire set of problems.37 For example, if 
welfare decreases the incentive to work, the effect should be greatest 
for women, who have lower wages than men and also benefit more 
directly from welfare. Yet labor force participation by women has 
increased.3s 
The third argument is less easily dismissed. In 1968, the fed-
eral government began a ten-year study, using 8700 subjects, of the 
effects of a guaranteed minimum income. Much to the chagrin of 
the sponsors, the program had seriously negative effects. Wives in 
the study reduced their interest in work by 20%. Young men who 
had not yet started families worked 43% less; even those who mar-
ried worked 33% less. Divorce rates increased substantially (66% 
for black families in New Jersey).39 Lest the reader suspect Murray 
of fudging his data, Farley has a similar report.40 The guaranteed 
income was apparently more generous than available welfare bene-
fits (otherwise no one would participate). At lower levels of welfare, 
work and marriage may be much more attractive as options. There-
fore, the results are not quantitatively meaningful as applied to the 
actual welfare system.4I Nevertheless, they strengthen the plausi-
36. See id. at 154-62. 
37. One would certainly need a quantitative model before even beginning to entertain 
this hypothesis. One would also like information on such factors as the changing availability 
and desirability of various alternatives to welfare. 
38. The labor force participation rate for black women increased between 1955 and 
1981 by 7 .5%. More than half the increase occurred after 1968. See Harrington, supra note 
28, at 8. 
39. See C. MURRAY, supra note l, at 148-53. 
40. R. FARLEY, supra note 15, at 53-54. 
41. As Farley points out, some other aspects of the experiment suggest that the results 
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bility of Murray's other arguments. 
The present welfare system quite possibly does have some sig-
nificant negative effects. It may well increase divorce and illegiti-
macy and decrease work, in the long run worsening the dependency 
of the poor.42 This is enough of an indictment without Murray's 
hyperbolic accusation that these problems are entirely caused by the 
welfare system. 
The solution, however, is not nearly as obvious as Murray 
would have us believe. Indeed, even assuming Murray's causation 
hypothesis is correct, his solution does not necessarily follow. Fire 
insurance no doubt increases the number of fires by decreasing the 
incentive to be careful and increasing the incentive for arson. Still, 
few argue for abolishing fire insurance. Its benefits are thought to 
outweigh its undoubted negative effects. 
Similarly, even if welfare harms the hard core poor, it reaches a 
great many others. Our last issue discussed a Michigan study that 
followed the lives of 5000 American families from 1968 to 1978.43 
The study found that over 25% of the population received some 
kind of welfare during that period. Only 10% received aid for as 
much as half of the period. And only 2% received aid for all ten 
years.44 It is this 2% who are presumably most likely to be victims 
of the Murray syndrome. But over ten times as many people re-
ceive welfare for shorter periods. (These numbers track similar 
figures about poverty. As we reported in our last issue, a great 
many people were poor for brief periods, often due to loss of em-
ployment or spouse, and then escaped poverty.) For these people, 
the welfare system serves as a kind of insurance against temporary 
hard times, not unlike the unemployment compensation Murray is 
willing to accept. 
Any proposal for welfare reform must consider three groups of 
people: 
(I) The large group of short-term poor identified in the Michigan study. 
(2) The much smaller group of persistent poor who are harmed by the welfare 
system (assuming Murray is correct). 
(3) Another group of the persistent poor (of uncertain size compared with group 
might actually be understated. See id. Jencks, supra note 34, attacks Murray's causation 
argument but does not address the income maintenance experiment, which seems to be Mur-
ray's strongest support. 
42. The statement in the text obviously represents my own values. Some radical femi-
nists might praise the welfare system for freeing black men from the tyranny of employers 
and freeing black women and children from the tyranny of men. I rather doubt, however, 
that any of those radicals have ever actually lived on welfare. 
43. Poveny, Earnings, and Discrimination, 2 CONST. COMM. 13 (1985). 
44. See G. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY: THE CHANGING Eco-
NOMIC FORTUNES OF AMERICAN WORKERS AND FAMILIES 74-78 (1984). 
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2), who need welfare, can't work or find spouses, and who will be left in des-
perate straits if welfare is abolished. This group includes many children.45 
Murray considers only the effect of welfare on group 2, assumes 
group 3 is much smaller, and ignores group 1 entirely. As a pre-
scription for reform, such an analysis can hardly be taken seriously. 
III 
Another question considered at much less length in Murray's 
book is that of affirmative action in employment. Let's begin again 
with the facts about black employees. 
The "good news" is aptly summarized by Murray: 
We may begin with a generalization. There is now a broad scholarly consensus 
that the gains in income parity are real and large among that subpopulation of 
blacks who obtained an education and stayed in the labor force. At the top of the 
ladder, the black-white discrepancy has shrunk to a few percentage points. By 
1980, black males in professional and technical occupations were making 86 percent 
of the salary of their white counterparts. Black females made 98 percent. 
When additional factors are taken into account---differences in quality of edu-
cation, years of experience, and so on-it may be that, for all practical purposes, the 
racial difference has disappeared for this one subgroup. Richard Freeman, a 
Harvard economist, argues that "[d]etailed investigation of the National Longitudi-
nal Survey shows that the occupational position of young black men entering the 
market after 1964 is essentially the same as that of young whites with similar back-
grounds," a conclusion that finds additional support in the 1973 Occupational 
Change in a Generation (OCG) survey. Members of the "black elite" entering the 
job market have achieved something very close to parity.46 
The percentage of blacks in white-collar jobs has more than doubled 
since 1960, up from 14% to 39% in 1980.47 As Harrington points 
out, there were dramatic gains in the percentages of black 
professionals: 
There were very real gains, particularly in the sixties but even in the seventies. The 
percentage of black accountants doubled between 1972 and 1981, from 4.3 percent 
to 9.9 percent; computer specialists went from 5.5 percent to 9.4 percent; chemists 
from 8.4 percent to 15.2 percent; medical doctors from 6.3 percent to ll percent. 
So the proportion of black doctors (11 percent) was almost equal to the official 
black percentage of the population as a whole (11.6 percent), and the chemists were 
well above it. All of these gains took place in the best-paid sector of American 
society, among professional and technical workers. 
Of course, things were not quite that good, even when progress was being 
made. The most striking black advances-they were 12.7 percent of the nurses in 
1981, 14.9 percent of the health technicians, 20.2 percent of the social and recrea-
tional workers, 11.4 percent of the elementary-school teachers, 15.5 percent of the 
kindergarten teachers-were in the lowest-paid reaches of the highest-paid cate-
45. As Murray himself says, "There is no such thing as an undeserving five-year-old." 
C. MURRAY, supra note l, at 223. 
46. /d. at 89. 
47. See id at 86. Much of the increase was in government employment. See id. at 87. 
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gory. In this, the situation of blacks and of women is strikingly similar. When 
either group gets into the professions, it tends to get the lesser roles (nurses rather 
than surgeons, dental technicians rather than dentists, and so on).48 
Economic gains were not, however, confined to the upper-end 
of the income spectrum. As Farley reports, "Between 1960 and 
1980 the earnings of blacks rose more rapidly than those of whites, 
and there is good reason to believe that racial discrimination in pay 
rates declined."49 Figure 2 on the next page illustrates the trends.so 
Both groups of blacks lag well behind white men but have made real 
progress. For example, with the same education, experience, re-
gional distribution, and hours of work as white men, black men to-
day would on the average make 88% as much. (One reason the gap 
has narrowed is that the earnings of white men have declined since 
the 1973 recession.)si 
Perhaps the greatest economic change has involved black wo-
men. As Murray puts it: 
The second group that made the most progress was black women-not just a 
highly educated elite, but women in a broad spectrum of occupations. Black wo-
men in all nonagricultural occupations had by 1980 effectively wiped out the racial 
discrepancy-which is to say, they were by then no more underpaid relative to 
white males than were white women. From managerial positions (106 percent of 
the white wage) to household workers (141 percent of the white wage), black wo-
men as of 1980 were earning as much as their white female counterparts. Of all 
nonfarm categories, the lowest ratio of black:white women's wages (100 means 
equality) was a high 94.3, for blue-collar operatives. In agriculture, the ratio was 
81.4.52 
Thus, black women as a group have now achieved the distinction of 
being economically disadvantaged only by being female, not by be-
ing black.53 (Of course, as Figure 2 shows, this still leaves them 
worse off than either black or white men, in terms of earnings.) 
48. M. HARRINGTON, supra note 31, at 136-37. 
49. R. FARLEY, supra note 15, at 72. 
50. Figure 2 (including the caption) is taken from id. at 73. 
51. Id. at 62. 
52. C. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 90-91. 
53. It would be more accurate to say that if black women suffer from continuing group 
discrimination as blacks, they must suffer less from gender discrimination than do white wo-
men. Also, even if discrimination is not sufficiently uniform to affect group earnings, individ-
ual black women are undoubtedly subject to racially discriminatory acts. 
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Figure 2 
The white bars on the left of each set are the actual annual earnings levels. The light bars in 
the middle of each set show what earnings would be if the group in question had had the 
same number of years of education, years of work experience, and regional distribution as 
white men. The dark gray bar adds the assumption of equal hours of work. 
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We shouldn't feel complacent about these numbers. Progress 
is still quite slow compared to the remaining gap in income between 
black and white families.s4 In sharp contrast to the dismal statistics 
on poverty, however, at least the movement is in the right direction. 
How much of this change is attributable to affirmative action 
or employment discrimination laws is impossible to say.ss Never-
theless, this seems a good place to apply the conservative maxim: 
"If it's not broken, don't fix it." If the earnings of employed blacks 
are rising, it seems reasonable to give at least part of the credit to 
Title VII and affirmative action. After all, Murray himself demon-
strates that black incomes and occupations have risen more rapidly 
than 1950's and 1960's trends would have predicted. 
It is possible, as Murray suggests, that discrimination laws help 
blacks with their initial salaries but hurt them in promotion or in 
getting hired in the first place.56 On the other hand, one would 
expect these effects to be strongest for black women, who get the 
most protection from Title VII and affirmative action since they are 
members of two protected classes (blacks and women). Yet the sta-
tistics on black women show strong gains. 
Drawing firm conclusions in such a treacherous area is risky. 
The statistics on earnings do suggest two lessons for the legal sys-
tem. First, the economic case against discrimination law and af-
firmative action has not been made. Second, black men, black 
women, and white women have all fared differently and should 
probably be treated separately for purposes of discrimination law. 
Although some pioneering work has been done in that direction, 
legal analysis of discrimination against subgroups is still in its form-
ative years.s1 
Perhaps a few closing words are in order about the three books 
discussed in this essay. Murray is provocative, readable, and an ac-
cessible source of statistics. Farley is drier and more technical, but 
also gives a much fuller analysis. Harrington is a sane, humane 
voice; I only wish I had more confidence that his better worldss is 
54. See R. FARLEY supra note 15, at 79-80. As he says earlier in the book, "(I]f the 
growth rates of 1959-1982 persist without interruption, the median incomes of black and 
white families in the United States will be equal in about three centuries." /d. at 15. 
55. For a thorough review of the literature, see Auerbach, The Relation of Legal Sys-
tems to Social Change, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1227, 1316-26. 
56. See C. MURRAY, supra note I, at 91-92. 
57. See Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Em-
ployment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1980). 
58. Harrington's goal is "the abolition of welfare through the creation of a full-employ-
ment society that would not need it." M. HARRINGTON, supra note 31, at 143. If only we 
knew how to create such a full-employment society without runaway inflation! 
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achievable. All three are well worth reading. But none of them has 
any answers in which one can put much faith. 
D.A.F. 
